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Introduction. 
 Adam Smith set down a theory of language functions and linguistic 
communication which is relevant to economic behavior.  Smith points out in WN that 
the division of labour and cooperation are a natural consequence of the persuasive use 
of language.  At its most basic, persuasion is a common linguistic strategy by which a 
speaker not only tries to convince a listener to perform a determined task, but rather 
convinces the listener of the fact that the task at hand is in her own best interest (Brooks 
and Warren, 1970).  Interestingly, Smith assumes this persuasive use of language to be 
the stimulating factor behind exchange, or trade.  In addition to this persuasive 
communication, Smith outlines another type of interaction, which I will refer to here as 
empathetic-inferential communication (Bach and Harnish, 1979), by which a speaker 
transmits her feelings or intentions to other speakers using a plain or uncodified style of 
speech.  This particular type of communication, contrary to the persuasive variety 
mentioned earlier, would be considered the type used in free or civil conversation.  The 
claim that language and the division of labour are inherently linked to the concept of 
persuasion originates from Smith and implies, as a necessary consequence, the idea that 
language is a method of communication employed for social cooperation.  And whereas 
in persuasive communication, the speaker receives a greater benefit than the listener, it 
is assumed that in the empathetic style of communication, the linguistic exchange is 
equal.  This present article illustrates that both language and trade require the 
empathetic use of linguistic communication. 
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 This paper is organized in two distinct parts.  In the first section, the theoretical 
framework is laid regarding the functions of language, as Smith has them envisaged, 
and their relationship to the division of labor.  And although this idea is original to 
Smith, the broader topic itself has been eluded to many times, as far back as the Ancient 
Philosophers, and more recently by William Petty and Bernard Mandeville.  
Nevertheless, the notion that persuasion is intrinsically linked to the division of labor is 
a concept exclusive to Smith.  Moreover, the existence of the two types of 
communication, persuasive and empathetic, is established in Smith, in which both styles 
of communication are compared in relation to the behavior of exchange or trade.   
 In the second section of this article I will argue that both exchange, or trade, and 
linguistic communication have their roots in the empathetic style of interaction outlined 
previously.  After all, it is the empathetic style that favors both speaker and listener in 
an even exchange, while persuasive communication necessarily assumes a greater 
benefit for the speaker.  Obviously, the notions of contractual interaction and trade must 
imply some sort of mutuality, if not trade would not occur.  And even though one 
participant may come out of the deal with a greater benefit than the other, this is a 
matter of perspective and dependent on the point of view of the participants in the 
interaction
1
. 
1.  Smith’s rhetoric of persuasion and economic behavior. 
                                                          
1
 Throughout the remainder of this article we will cite the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of 
Adam Smith from Liberty Fund Press, Indianapolis, 1982.  A list of abbreviations extracted from Smith’s works 
includes the following: 
 Vol. I  TMS  The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  
     D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (editors). 
 Vol. II   WN  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the    
                                  Wealth of Nations. 
     R.H Campbell and A.S. Skinner (editors). 
 Vol. IV  LRBL   Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 
     J.C. Bryce (editor). 
 Vol V  LJ  Lectures on Jurisprudence. 
     R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein (editors). 
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 The relationship between the communicative use of language and economic 
behavior appears for the first time in Adam Smith (WN, I.ii), in which Smith links 
language with the economic behavior of the exchange of goods, or trade.   Throughout 
the course of his essay, Smith illustrates the relationship between the seemingly 
unrelated topics of language, moral conduct and economic policy.  Effectively, the 
outcome of this relationship results in a theory of the functions of language and 
linguistic communication that later appears in TMS, LRBL, LJ and WN, and later 
serving as the corner stone of Smith’s theory concerning moral sentiments, or human 
conduct in general, and economic behavior.  The Theory of Moral Sentiments is 
fundamentally supported by the theoretical requirement known as the propriety of 
speech (McKenna, 2006), while economic behavior implies a dependence on 
persuasion, a communicative use of language. 
1.1 Division of labor and its relationship to persuasive communication. 
 Smith’s views on the division of labor are anything but new to economists.  
Nevertheless, in Schumpeter’s 1954 work (p.187-88), more than a casual reference is 
made to the scholarly antecedents to Smith’s claims regarding labor and language.   
Nevertheless, after a careful scrutiny of the literature, I will demonstrate herein that the 
association between the use of language and the division of labor is, indeed and 
indisputably, original to Smith. 
 Among the precedents mentioned in Schumpeter (1954) is a reference to Plato’s 
Republic (369-370 BCE).  More recently, Gloria Sapienza (2001) insists not only in the 
manifest influence of Plato (“unmistakable echo of Plato”), but also an unambiguous 
similarity to the works of Xenophon (Cyropedia, VIII 2, and Oeconomicus II 14-18 ).  
Additionally, Sapienza points out that the division of labor as a cause of productivity is 
inconsistent with the works of both Plato and Xenophon.  Notwithstanding, while Smith 
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describes the manufacturer division of labor, Plato and Xenophon deal exclusively with 
the division of labor by individual activities (cloth makers, shoe makers, tailors etc).  
Moreover, neither in Plato nor in Xenophon is even a nonchalant association made 
between the division of labor and language. 
 Schumpeter goes on to cite William Petty as another intellectual precursor to 
Smith.  Indeed, one can find several allusions to the manufacturer division of labor 
throughout Petty’s economic papers.  In Another Essay in Political Arithmetick (1682) 
Petty characterizes the earnings gained from the manufacturer division of labor in the 
following manner: 
 (1) 
 The gain which is made by manufacturers, will be greater, as the 
manufacture itself is greater, for in so vast city manufacturers will beget one 
another, and each manufacture will be divided into as many parts as 
possible, whereby the work of each artisan will be simpler and easier; as for 
example.  In the making of a watch, if one man shall make the wheels, 
another the spring, another shall engrave the dial plate, and another shall 
make the cases, then the watch will be better and cheaper, then if the whole 
work be put on any one man. 
 
 Additionally, Petty was concerned with issues of language and grammar, 
eventually publishing “A Dictionary of Sensible Words”.  In his years as professor at 
Oxford, Petty formed part of the same prestigious circle as linguist and mathematician 
John Wallis and mathematician and philosopher John Wilkins.  Together these three 
would, in due course, go on to partake in a project regarding universal language.  Even 
so, Petty never establishes any indication of a relationship between the division of labor 
and language. 
 Smith’s immediate predecessor, Bernard Mandeville, in his work entitled The 
Fable of the Bees (1732), describes the trade activity necessary to acquire a dress: 
 (2) 
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 What a bustle is there to be made in several parts of the world, before a 
fine scarlet or crimson cloth can be produced, what multiplicity of trades 
and artificers must be employed!  Not only such as are obvious, as wool-
combers, spinners, the weaver, the cloth-worker, the courier, the dyer, the 
setter, the drawer, and the packer; but others that are more remote and might 
seem foreign to it. 
 
And even though Mandeville addresses the topic of language to a certain extent in his 
satire (vol. 2, Dialog VI), arguing in favor of a persuasive function of language, one 
could search in vain for even a passing link between language and the division of labor.  
For that, we must turn now to Adam Smith. 
 The relationship between the communicative use of language and the division of 
labor in Smith is not an explicit matter.  Even so, Smith’s economic and linguistic 
theories do provide sufficient substantiation which supports this associative claim.  
Such claims have been defended in Wärneryd (1995) and Alonso-Cortés (2007). 
 Smith, in WN, points out that the division of labor could have been the logical 
consequence of language: 
 (3) 
 The division of labour… is the necessary, though very slow and gradual 
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature… the propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.  Whether this propensity 
be one of those original principles in human nature… or whether it be the 
necessary consequence of the faculty of reason and speech, it belongs not to 
our present subject to enquire. 
 
  Although in the preceding passage, WN suggests that both reason and speech are 
responsible for the division of labor, further sections of WN, as well as other essays by 
Smith, are less ambiguous about this association, concluding that this division is 
ultimately dependent on persuasion.  
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 Moreover, Smith defends the position that both the division of labor as well as 
language and cooperation are exclusive traits to human beings
2
: 
 (4)  
 It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, 
which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. 
 
 According to Smith, animals acquire what they want from other animals or man 
by way of adulation.  And while man as well uses this technique, the habitual mode is 
by persuasion (WN I ii.): 
 (5) 
 He will be  more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-interest in his 
favour, and show them that  it is for their advantage to do for him what he 
requires of them.  Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes 
to do this.  Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you 
want, is the meaning of every such offer… so it is the same trucking 
disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. 
 
  This same account for the division of labor and money is repeated in LJ (p. 56): 
 
 (6) 
 If we should enquire into the principle of human mind on which this 
disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination every 
one has to persuade.  The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have 
so plain and simple meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade 
one to do so and so as it is for his interest.  Men always endeavor to 
persuade others… and in this manner every one is practicing oratory on 
others thro the whole life.  
 
To recapitulate then, Smith’s argument consists of the following: 
1. The division of labor emerges from man’s propensity to exchange. 
2. The propensity to exchange results from persuasion, or communicative 
use of language. 
                                                          
2
 Both the division of labor and cooperation and exchange are exclusive to the human species.  
Chimpanzees and cappuccino monkeys of the same social group will commit themselves to the 
cooperative hunt (Stanford, 1999; de Waal, 2000), but the non-human primates do not make use of the 
division of labor (Wilson, 1975).  What is more important still, neither chimpanzees nor the cappuccino 
monkeys understand the actions of the other in that cooperation (Chalmeau, Visalberghi and Gallo, 1997) 
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3. Hence, the division of labor is a development originating in persuasion,a  
communicative use of language. 
 Smith’s theorem3, which understands the division of labor as a result of the 
communicative use of language, has struck a chord not only in the Economic Sciences, 
but in Linguistics as well.  As follows, language for Smith is a manifestly 
communicative and cooperative system, as opposed to Condillac’s (1746) idealization 
which understands language as merely an instrument which facilitates thinking, and  
disparate to Humboldt’s (1836) conception of language as a Weltanschaung (or world 
view).  Later, the communicative character of language that Locke assumed in An Essay 
on Human Understanding is directly acquired form Smith.  Saussure (1916) the father 
of modern Linguistics confirms years later Smith’s assertion that language is indeed a 
social action. 
 The link between linguistic communication and the division of labor, or 
specialization, introduces language as a phenomenon of social cooperation.  Smith 
makes it known that only where this is division of labor will there also be 
communication as a requirement of cooperation.   
 It seems rather surprising then that studies which have dealt with the topic of 
language in Smith (Berry, 1974; Plank, 1992; Dascal, 2006) never make any mention of 
the communicative use of language and the division of labor.  As a matter of fact, some 
of the most important theoreticians in 20
th
 century Linguistics vehemently defend the  
notion of language as a function of social cooperation, but avoid even a simple 
                                                          
3
 Bazerman (1993) claims that WN is a project based on rhetoric, but does not explain how persuasion is 
a method of communication nor what type of communication is involved in persuasion.  It is important to 
note that Smith’s rhetorical grounding has nothing to do with the claims introduced by Deirdre 
McCloskey (1985, 1994). 
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reference to Smith.  Gardiner (1931, 1951) Bloomfield (1933) and Bühler (1934, 1990) 
all recognize that language is a method of communication by which an emitter/speaker 
exercises some influence over a receptor/listener.  Particularly, Gardiner insists in the 
cooperative character of language, which he believes is rooted in the social nature of 
man and the dependence that each individual has on one other.  Only Bloomfield (1933, 
§2.2) associates language and the division of labor, but evades any citation of Smith. 
 With language: 
 (7) 
 Each person has at his disposal the strength and skill of every person in the 
group.   The more the persons differ as to special skills, the wider the range 
of power does each person control.  Only one person needs to be a good 
climber, since he can get fruit for all the rest; only one needs to be a good 
fisherman, since he can supply the others with the fish.  The division of 
labour, and, with it, the whole working of human society is due to language.  
 
1.2 The two styles of communication in Adam Smith 
 The connection between the communicative use of language and the division of 
labor is anything but random.  As it happens, Smith formalizes a theory of the functions 
of language, preceding his economic policies, which sanction this association.   
 In LRBL
4
 Smith characterizes three functions of language: communicative, 
narrative and esthetic.  This communicative function can be further distinguished into 
two types: (i) persuasive communication and (ii) sympathetic, or empathetic, 
communication.  Persuasive communication corresponds to the model of language 
conceived by Plato and Aristotle (Figure 1) which understands language as an 
instrument of man, i.e. an organon to inform about things, while the sympathetic or 
empathetic variety is consistent with the current model of inferential communication 
                                                          
4
 LRBL have been studied by J.C. Bryce (1992), A. Skinner (1983), W.S. Howell (1975) and Salvucci 
(1982). 
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(Bach and Harnish, 1979).  In the following sections, 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, we will address 
both kinds of interaction. 
 
1.2.1  Persuasive, or Machiavellian, communication 
 The theoretical justification for persuasive communication takes its inspiration 
from the classical notion of language as an instrument, or Rhetoric as it were.  This 
model holds that language is a tool used by an emitter, or speaker, to relay information 
as well as to appeal to or influence the behavior of the receptor, or listener.  In 
contemporary studies, this idea has been espoused by such linguists as Gardiner, 
Bloomfield, and Bühler.  Karl Bühler (1934 and 1990) goes even a step further, 
comparing non-human animal signals to this persuasive use of language.   After all, 
both animal signals and language do influence or appeal to the receptor: “ In human and 
animal communication with signs, it is the appeal that first and most exactly becomes 
evident to the analyst, namely in the behavior of the receiver” (Bühler, 1990, 38).  
Bühler refines this notion, claiming that it is rhetoric which is responsible for the 
appellative function of language.  More recently, Dawkins (2006, 282) confirms 
Bühler’s comparison and claims that: “A nightingale’s song is not information, not even 
deceitful information.  It is persuasive, hypnotic, spellbounding oratory.”  Thus, it 
seems that according to these authors, even animal signals qualify as rhetoric or 
persuasive communication.  However, these authors do not mention the important fact 
that in both animal and human communication, the emitter and the receptor do not 
obtain mutual benefits since naturally, they do not share common interests.  In human 
rhetorical communication, the speaker is not trusted because of what he says, but rather 
due to his ethos, which can be feigned.   It is for this reason precisely that this mode of 
communication can be called Machiavellian.  
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 Machiavelli, in The Prince (chapter XVIII), recommends that the governor 
simulate a trustable character: “ it could be easily shown how many treatise of peace, 
and how many engagements have been made null and void by the faithfulness of 
princes.  But it is necessary that the prince should know how to color this nature well, 
and how to be a great hypocrite and dissembler.  For men are so simple that the 
deceiver will never lack dupes.”   
 It should not seem striking then that Smith (WN, III.ii.), following Machiavelli 
and de Mandeville (1720, part 2)
5
 admits that persuasion is at the service of the 
proprietor who is versed in such use of language:  “The pride of man makes him love to 
domineer, and nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend to 
persuade his inferiors.”  In LJ (iii.60) Smith goes on to assert that persuasion requires 
seduction: “for there is always some seduction necessary to persuade.”   
 In TMS (VII 4), there appears, time and time again, the notion that moral 
conduct, the desire to be believed and to persuade, is a natural desire that underlies both 
the capacity to produce language and commercial exchange.  And of all the affronts 
which a person might suffer, the worst is that of being thought a liar, since this 
accusation diminishes our capacity to persuade:  
 (8) 
 The desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, of leading and 
directing other people, seems to one of the strongest of all our desires.  It is 
the instinct on which is founded the faculty of speech, the characterized 
faculty of human nature.  No other animal possesses this faculty, and we 
cannot discover in any other animal any desire to lead and direct the 
judgment and conduct of its fellows… Great ambition, the desire of 
superiority, of leading and directing, seems to be altogether peculiar to man, 
and speech is the great instrument of ambition, of real superiority, of leading 
and directing the judgment and conduct of other people. 
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 Bernard Mandeville (1729, Part 2).  Mandeville denies that language serves to know the thoughts and 
feelings of the speaker, but in a phase preceding the evolution of the faculty of language, two beasts 
would have understood each other without the need for language. 
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 Smith (TMS, I 3.ii) offers the example of King Louis XIV to illustrate his claim 
concerning superiority: “The sound of his voice, noble and affecting, gained those 
hearts which his presence intimidated.”  
 Persuasion drives not only exchange and the division of labor, but rather society 
itself, and does so with greater brawn than sympathy is capable of wielding.  For 
society, asserts Smith (TMS, II2 iii), does not offer assistance out of legitimate 
generosity or selflessness, but manages to survive: “among different men, as among 
different merchants, from a sense of utility, without any mutual love or affection…, it 
may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed 
valuation.”    
1.  Situation of time and space in the speech act (A): 
 
[Smith narrative] 
 
        Represents or symbolizes (symbolic or representative function) 
 
2.  Em                                3.  Ei                                      4. Rc 
 
                                           Expresses a state of                          Persuades the Rc to change  
             the Em(itter)                       his conduct   
 
         (expressive function)           (Persuasive function: *didactic,             
                                                                           deliberative and judicial in Adam Smith) 
 
Figure (1): Model of the instrumental use of language or “Machiavellian 
communication model”. (Plato, Aristotle, Smith, Gardiner (1931 and 1951), and Bühler 
(1934 and 1990). 
 
 The speaker/emitter (Em) directs an expression Ei, derived from a common 
language L, to a receptor/listener in which the expression refers to objects or states in a 
time-space context in order to influence the listener.  This act of communication can be 
modeled as the function F (Em(itter), E(xpression), Rc(receptor), O(bject), S(pace-
time)). 
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 In the model proposed in Fig 1, speech is the expression of some characteristic, 
be it biological (man or woman), psychological (state of being), social or individual, in 
relation to the speaker.  In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the emitter’s speech conveys the 
trustworthiness (or lack thereof) of the speaker; naturally, she must demonstrate a good 
ethos in order to establish a certain trust with the receptor (Rhet. 1356).  From the 
listener’s perspective, however, the speech is persuasive because listeners are 
“incapable” of inferring (Aristotle, Rhet. 1357a).  
 The narrative function deals with the description of objects and facts (LRBL, 
12), while the esthetic function has as its main objective to entertain or interest the 
listener.  This esthetic function can be sub-categorized into two different forms: prose 
and poetry.  Poetry, which precedes prose, accompanies music and diversion and is 
common to all inhabitants of every municipality, regardless of the socio-cultural or 
socio-economic status of the populace.  Prose, on the other hand, is a convention of 
trade and commerce, and represents the communicative style found in commercial 
contracts: “ No one ever made a bargain in verse; pleasure is not what he there aims at” 
LRBL, 23). 
 It is critical to bear in mind that, in persuasion, the speaker intends to domineer 
and seduce the listener.  Modern rhetorical theory ( Cleanth and Warren 1970,288) 
characterizes persuasion as “the art, primarily verbal, by which you get somebody to do 
what you want and make him at the same time, think that this is what he had wanted to 
do all the time.”  It should not seem remarkable then to learn that persuasive oratory 
was readily and abundantly exploited in the trade arrangements made by the 18
th
 
century English colonists with the indigenous population of the Continent.  The North 
American historian Wilbur Jacobs ( 1972, 52  ) elaborates on this ever so common 
procedure:    
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 (9) 
 The astute merchant used to keep a careful watch of the credit he would 
give.  His purpose was to keep his Indian clients in a perpetual state of debt.  
But in order to get from his victims the largest number of pelts, the 
trafficker would have to fawn over and dazzle the best warriors with nice 
and flattering words.  Although the Indians enjoyed the colorful rhetoric of 
the camp diplomacy, they never full let themselves be completely seduced 
by such words.  They would examine with care the unclear intentions of the 
one speaking.  But no trafficker could permit himself to ignore the art of the 
camp oratory, because it constituted an important factor in capturing the 
adhesion of the Indians. 
 
 For sure, this technique in trickery by the tradesmen was censured by Smith in 
WC (I.x.c.) when referring to the monopoly that the industrial corporations had in 
European cities, in striking contrast to the laborers, farmers and landholders of the era: 
 (10) 
 They have commonly neither the inclination nor the fitness to enter into 
combinations; and clamour and sophistry of merchants and manufacturers 
easily persuade them that the private interest of a part, and a subordinate 
part of the society, is the general interest of the whole. 
 
 Persuasion, nevertheless, is a consequence of freedom.  The lord who dominates 
his workers by slavery does not persuade, for he does not negotiate.  When Adam Smith 
depicts the disadvantages of slavery versus the advantages of the free worker, he 
observes that with worker independence, salaries turn out less costly than to have the 
same work done by a slave.  But worker independence demands negotiation, which 
contrasts significantly with the desire to dominate and direct others.  Such desire to 
dominate prevails over persuasion in order to negotiate: 
 (11)  
 The love of domination and authority over others, which I am afraid is 
natural to mankind, a certain desire of having others below one, and the 
pleasures it gives one to have some persons whom he can order to do this 
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work rather than be obliged to persuade others to have to bargain with him, 
will forever hinder this from taking place
6
.   
 
 In spite of the fact that three types of persuasion are distinguished in LRBL,   
Smith never specifies which type governs trade agreements (see figue 1).  Nonetheless, 
there is no doubt as to whether deliberative persuasion is employed in this commercial 
exchange.  In this type of persuasion, the persuader tries to sway the second party 
gradually, especially when there is some prejudice toward the speaker by the second 
party (LRBL, 24). 
1.2.2 Empathetic  or inferential communication 
 Together with the Machiavellian, or persuasive, model of communication, Smith 
presents yet another prototype of communication, which I will call here empathetic 
communication.   In this model, communicative speech is characterized by the objective 
of the speaker to awaken the interest, ideas, thoughts or sentiments of the listener in a 
mutual way.  To obtain this end, the speaker must codify his speech with certain 
stylistic traits: perspicuity
7
, clarity (non-ambiguity), relevance and propriety.  These 
stylistic properties of rhetoric elaborated by Smith permit the listener to recognize or 
infer the intention of the speaker.   
 Of course, a certain mental capacity must also accompany these stylistic 
properties in order for the listener to surmise the intention of the speaker.  This capacity 
is known as sympathy and it is what allows a sentiment to resonate from speaker to 
listener and make the listener feel for the speaker.  In contemporary psychological 
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 Hegel would surely agree (1807: B.A. 3) since the essence of lordship is “the opposite of what it wants  
to be”.   
7
 In LJ ii.46 he explains that the ambiguity and uncertainty with regards to language in which contracts 
were written in the past damaged the validity of the contracts.  Uncertainty with regards to language 
signifies that the language itself does not allow the intentions of the contracting individuals to be seen.  
As a result, the communicative speech used in contracts should follow a strict style.   
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terminology, this is more commonly known as empathy, which is defined by Eisenberg 
(2000, 678) as: “the capacity to adopt the role of the other and adopt alternative 
perspectives of oneself”.  And while sympathy causes some effect in the other, it is not 
necessary that she adopt the same perspective as the speaker.   
 This empathetic-inferential model of communication appears in Locke, An Essay 
on Human Understanding (III i&ii.).  As opposed to the models in which language is 
understood as an instrument or tool by which some information is conveyed, or other 
communicative models grounded in persuasion, Locke claims that the objective of 
language is merely to communicate the ideas and thoughts of a speaker to a listener: 
 (12) 
 The comfort and advantage of society, not being to be had without 
communication of thoughts, it was necessary, that man should find out some 
external sensible signs, whereby those invisible ideas, which his thoughts 
are made up of, might be made known to others. 
 
 Locke insists in two decisive points: (1) that thoughts are private and unavailable 
to other minds and, thus, true communication between two individuals is impossible; 
and (2) that common language is imperfect (Essay, III, viii-x).  Accordingly, Smith later 
makes his own assertion on the topic stating that, “language is uncertain” (LJ). 
 In order to arrive at communication vis-à vis language, pertaining to the inner 
sphere of the speaker in which neither the true meaning of the speaker’s words is known 
nor the intention of the speaker
8
, Locke puts forth strategies which allow meaning to be 
inferred (step (ii) of the empathetic communication model found in (Fig. 2):  These 
                                                          
8
 The reason for the discord between linguistic communication and the intentions of the speaker could lie 
in how language evolved in relation to empathy’s evolutionary tract.  Language evolved culturally at a 
greater speed than the mental capacity required to grasp the concept of empathy which has a genetic, 
neurophysiological base, and whose evolution would have taken place over a greater span of time.  Not 
allowing one’s intentions to be manifest is a form of self-protection and has value related to survival and 
biological efficiency, or fitness.  
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strategies are: (i) common use strategy
9
, or propriety of word use (Essay, II. xxii. 9 and 
III, ix. 8).  Even so, Locke specifies that “no body having an authority to establish the 
precise signification of words”, and determines that this common use is insufficient; (ii) 
strategy of reference: words refer to perceivable phenomena by the speaker and listener 
involved in the speech act (Essay, III. ii. 5); (iii) common knowledge strategy: the 
listener attributes the same meaning to the words by analogy (Essay, III, ii.iv); (iv) 
strategy of constant connection between ideas and sounds (Essay, III. ii. 6).  
Furthermore, Locke (Essay, IV, xvii.4) suggests that there must be some capacity 
inherent to the listener which allows her to infer the communicative intention of the 
speaker: 
 (13) 
 Tell a country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weather is 
louring, and like to raine, and she will easy understand, it is not safe for her 
to go abroad thin clad, in such a day, after a fever: she clearly sees the 
probable connexion of all these, viz.  South-west wind, and clouds, rain, 
wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death.   
 
 Locke goes on to say that the mind “either very desirous to inlarge its 
knowledge, or very apt to favour the sentiments it has once imbibed, is very forward to 
make inferences, and therefore often makes too much hast, before it perceives the 
connexion of ideas…”.  This inferential capacity is the fundamental component of 
empathetic-inferential communication, which demands relevance of the expression; in 
other words, that the listener is able to easily deduce the inferences that allow the 
communicative intentions of the speaker to be identified. 
                                                          
9
 Common use due to tacit consent (III.ii.8), or convention, is the foundation of meaning in David Lewis 
(1969). 
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 In Some Thoughts Concerning Education and other correspondences, Locke
10
  
advocates free and civil conversation in which the speakers negotiate and communicate 
their personal thoughts with the principal objective of obtaining the truth, and not to 
persuade one another with their ideas.    
 David Hume (1739), in the same vein as Locke, Hutcheson (1725), and 
Shaftersbury (1732), put his own personal twist on the study of human communication 
upon decidedly grounding this phenomenon in sympathy, or empathy.  It is worth 
mentioning that this concept of sympathy in Hume, and likewise in Smith, is equivalent 
to the broader concept of sympathy as sentiment.  Essentially, sympathy
11
, as Hume 
envisages this concept (Treatise, vol. 2, Book II, section xi), communicates a feeling 
from one person to another, and which already exists in the person receiving the 
message.  However, communicated sentiment does not emerge automatically, as, for 
example, does the vibrating sympathy of two guitar strings, but rather the imagination 
intervenes in order to symbolize the feeling.  For this reason, Hume (Treatise, II, xii) 
claims: 
 (14)  
 This is the nature and cause of sympathy; and it is after this manner we 
enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, wherever we 
discover them. 
 
 Sympathy (i.e. empathy), according to Hume, communicates feeling by way of 
expression, being perceived in the voice and in gestures (Treatise, III i), and produces 
the causes and effects of fondness, as well as others. The listener, hence, is capable of 
inferring this passion which ultimately results from sympathy.  In this way, empathy can 
                                                          
10
 John Locke (1689), in Locke (1824). 
11
 Also, Locke uses sympathy as sentiment as a uniting force of society, although this concept does not 
play an exceptional role; see John Locke, Economic Writings and Two Treatise of Government, 1691, vol. 
4 from The Works of John Locke, London, Rivington, §212. 
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be understood as a process of communicative inference, and Hume’s scheme of 
empathetic communication itself represents the ideal form of free linguistic 
communication. 
 Thus, in his essay “Of Political Society” found in An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals (1751), Hume establishes what could be considered the archtype of 
the conservatory use of language, typical of the Enlightenment: 
 (15) 
 The more we converse with mankind and the greater social intercourse we 
maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preference and 
distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could scarcely 
be rendered intelligible to each other.  General language, therefore, being 
formed for general use, must be moulded on some more general views, and 
must affix the epithets of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, 
which arise from the general interests of the community.   
 
 In the same essay, Hume insists in the necessity to make our sentiments more 
public and social, especially so if the interlocutor is not an intimate confidant.  
Conversation, accordingly, is submitted to an ethic norm based on approval or 
disapproval, as later Smith will go on to pronounce: 
 (16) 
 The intercourse of sentiments therefore in society and conversation, makes 
us form some unalterable standard by which we may approve or disapprove 
of characters and manners. 
  
 The empathetic model of communication by which Hume is inspired, is later 
adopted by Smith.  Concretely, in TMS (VIII4), Smith envisions sympathy, or empathy 
as it were, as the gear that moves sentiment to expression.  Notwithstanding, the 
objective of sympathy is to direct the conversation, not exchange or trade: 
 (17) 
 The great pleasure of conversation and society, besides, arises from a 
certain correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony 
18 
 
of minds, which, like so many musical instruments
12
, coincide and keep 
time with one another.  But this most delightful harmony cannot be obtained 
unless there is a free communication  of sentiments and opinions. 
 
Free communication, for Smith, communicates feelings and opinions, but to arrive at 
free conversation, Smith asserts: 
 (18) 
  We all desire to feel how each other is affected, to penetrate into 
each other’s bosoms, and to observe the sentiments and affections which 
really subsist there.  The  man who indulges us in this natural passion, who 
invites us into his heart, who, as it were, sets open the gates to his breast to 
us, seems to exercise a species of hospitality more delightful than any other. 
 
 This sentimental communication is quite incompatible with the persuasive type 
communication mentioned earlier, where the speaker wants to exercise some influence 
over the listener.  Sympathy, cites Smith, is not the appropriate means by which to 
promote the public welfare, nor manufacture, nor trade or commerce (TMS, IV i), but 
rather persuasion: 
 (19) 
 …if you would implant public virtue in the breast of him who seems 
heedless of the interest of his country…You will be more likely to persuade, 
if you describe the great system of public police which procures these 
advantages. 
  
 Empathetic communication is the objective of common language (LRBL, 3) by 
which both speaker and listener make known their personal thoughts.  In this same 
lecture, Smith presents a scenario analogous to a coordination game where two savages 
negotiate to establish empathetic communication: 
 (20) 
  Two savages who meet together and took up their dwelling in the 
same place would very soon endeavour to get signs to denote these objects 
which most frequently occurred and with which they were most concerned.  
The cave they lodged in, the tree from whence they got their food, the 
                                                          
12
 The comparison of mental harmony with musical instruments is first introduced in Hume’s Treatise. 
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fountain…, would all soon be distinguished by particular names, as they 
would have frequent occasion to make their thoughts about these 
known to one another, and would by mutual consent agree on certain 
signs whereby this might be accomplished. 
  
 In LRBL (6, 8, and 11) Smith elaborates further on this empathetic means of 
communication, according to which conversational language must communicate the 
sentiments of the speaker (LRBL,6): 
 (21) 
  When the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a neat, clear, 
plain, and clever manner, and the passion or affection he is possessed of and 
intends, by sympathy, to communicate to his hearer, is plainly and 
cleverly hit off, then and then only the expression has all the force and 
beauty that language can give it.     
 
 Therefore, to carry out this communication, speech must incorporate the 
following stylistic qualities: (i) perspicuity, (ii) brevity, (iii) propriety, and (iv) order
13
.  
Moreover, so that communication be successful, the speaker must be bound by two 
ethical requirements: veracity and sincerity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Some of these stylistic characteristics were proposed by Theophrastus of  Eresus (370-285 B.C.E).  
Ciceron addresses them in De Oratore(I. 144): “ oratoris vis facultas in quinque partes distribute,…, 
inventa non solum ordine… pure et latine loquamur, deinde ut plane et delucide, tum ut ornate, post ad 
rerum dignitate apte et quasi decore”.  Expression , says Ciceron, must be orderly, grammatically 
correct, clear and proper.  The rhetoric of Theophrastus  is found now in William Fortenbaugh (1992).  
Propriety is the foundation of Smith’s TMS; see S. McKenna (2006) 
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Figure 2- Empathetic-inferential model of communication
14
 
1. Time-space situation in the act of speech, S. 
Ei refers to objects and facts 
Inferences 
2.  Em                                3.  Ei                                      4. Rc   (i) Rc. identifies Ei {L} 
 
 
(ii)  = {knowledge, beliefs, common uses and mutual expectations} 
 
(iii) Recognition of Ij in E1 
Em: speaker; Rc: listener; Ei : expression; L: language of speaker and listener; Ij: intention of speaker. 
 This model of communication can be represented as the function F(Em,E, Rc, , 
S); the combination  contains the choices of a rational speaker which form part of the 
Theory of Rational Choice. 
 In empathetic communication, the speaker wants the listener to recognize her 
intention Ij vis-à-vis the expression Ei.  This expression carries the aforementioned 
                                                          
14
 This model of communication has been proposed and elaborated in several Works by Locke (1700), 
Hume (1731), Smith (1759) and LRBL, Husserl (1900-1901), Austin (1962), Grice (1967), Searle (1969), 
Bach and Harnish (1979), and Sperber and Wilson (1996). 
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stylistic conditions: (i) relevance, (ii) propriety, (iii) brevity, (iv) informativeness, (v), 
perspicuity, or non- ambiguousness.  The speaker recognizes Ij by way of an inference 
process in which the combination formed in  is comprised of knowledge, beliefs, and 
common uses as well as mutual expectations with the speaker. 
2.  Language and trade originate in empathy, not persuasion 
 One must ponder why Smith adopts the persuasive model of communication for 
exchange and commerce.  An initial justification for this claim may lie in the Theory of 
Double Intercourse elaborated by Vernon Smith (1998)
15
. According to the scenario 
proposed by this theory, in an exchange between two acquaintances, and between two 
complete strangers, the exchange which transpires between two strangers requires 
persuasion, while that which occurs between acquaintances does not.  However, there is 
no internal evidence in Adam Smith’s works which support this claim.  And whereas 
Smith never elaborates a precise theory regarding trade, the function of trust with 
respect to salaries (22), money (23) and trade (24-25) is a recurrent theme found 
throughout WN: 
 (22) 
  We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our 
life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney.  Such confidence could not 
safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition.  Their reward 
must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so 
important trust requires. (WN, I.x.b) 
 
 (23) 
  When the people of any particular country have such confidence in 
the fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that 
he is always ready to pay upon demand such of his promissory notes are as 
likely to be at any time presented to him; those notes come to have the same 
currency as gold and silver money, from the confidence that such money 
can at any time be had for them.    (WN, II.ii) 
 
(24) 
                                                          
15
 Vernon Smith (1998) and also Pedro Schwartz (2006). 
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  A country that has no mines of its own must undoubtedly draw its 
gold and silver from foreign countries, in the same manner as one that has 
no vineyards of its own must draw its wines… We trust with perfect 
security that the freedom of trade, without any attention of government, will 
always supply us with the wine which we have occasion for: and we may 
trust with equal security that it will always supply us with all the gold an 
silver we can afford to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our 
commodities, or in other uses.  (WN, iv.i) 
  
(25) 
  Commerce and manufacturers, in short, can seldom flourish in any 
state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of 
government.  The same confidence which disposes great merchants and 
manufacturers, upon ordinary occasions, to trust their property to the 
protection of a particular government, disposes them, upon extraordinary 
occasions, to trust that government with the use of their property.  (WN, V. 
iii)   
  
 It should be noted that in all these cases, it is not persuasion, but rather trust that 
drives exchange and commerce.   
 Another possible answer to the question of why Smith embraces the persuasive 
model of communication for the exchange of goods could lie in the hypothesis of 
Machiavellian intelligence developed by Byrne and Whiten (1997), which asserts that 
human intelligence has its origins in social manipulation, cheating, and malicious 
cooperation.  Smith’s prototype of persuasive rhetoric, in fact, is consistent with this 
concept of malicious cooperation, in that the listener is manipulated to a greater or 
lesser degree during the exchange of goods.   Upon adopting the Machiavellian model 
of communication, instead of the empathetic prototype, in order to explain the division 
of labor and the exchange of goods, Smith has failed in providing a satisfactory account 
for  them. 
 Firstly, the Machiavellian model of communication establishes an unstable 
cooperation.  In reality, this is a means of cooperation in which the participants commit 
themselves to a type of prisoner’s dilemma.  In one round of the game, an agent A must 
persuade another agent B, who, later in the second round, must try to persuade agent A.  
23 
 
In both rounds, it should be pointed out that the agent is being persuaded, B and A 
respectively, cooperate with their persuader to a certain extent.  Assuming that the 
benefit of the persuader is always somewhat more advantageous than the benefit 
received by the persuadee, a contract of stable cooperation is unlikely to ever emerge 
from this context.  In persuasive communication, then,  “talk is cheap”.  But exchange, 
or trade, requires stability, contradicting the suggestion that one of the interlocutors may 
gain a more valuable result than the other. 
 In the second place, because communication is established according to the 
principle of non-profit cooperation which governs language ( “ talk is cheap”), only 
empathetic linguistic communication, which is grounded in the conditions of the 
veracity and sincerity of the communicative intention, establishes a certain trust 
between the engaged participants. 
 Contemporary theories in the pragmatic studies of language, which were 
inaugurated with Grice (1967), are centered on the assumption  that “talk is cheap”,  and 
therefore speakers cooperate”.16    When, by way of empathy, a link of trust is generated 
between speaker and listener, a preliminary path is initiated toward social cooperation 
and the fair exchange which underlie both language and trade.  Persuasion is no longer 
necessary for exchange, since, as Smith claims, persuasion directs and dominates the 
listener.  In fact, if language is an evolutionarily stable system, it is due to the fact that 
empathetic communication has been imposed over this Machiavellian form of 
communication, even though this last form has not been altogether excluded.  But if 
Smith’s two savages developed language, it is because, by living together, they would 
have acted with the trust which empathy produces.  In point of fact, an experimental test 
                                                          
16
 Machiavellian communication is a type of secondary communication for human beings.  In the usual 
conversational communication, language is not used as if it were didactic or deliberative rhetoric with the 
objective to alter the behavior of the listener.  
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of the prisoner’s dilemma revealed that when two players have spoken 30 minutes 
before the start of the first round of the game, in 74% of the cases, the players do 
cooperate
17
.  
3. Conclusions 
  Adam Smith has made a significant and original contribution to the study of language 
upon laying the foundation of Locke’s  claim  that language is a communicative means. 
Upon doing so, Smith justifies that language is a necessary method of communication 
for social cooperation, whose function is to coordinate the actions of the speakers.  In 
studying language, Smith conceives two means of communication: persuasive, or 
Machiavellian, and empathetic.  For Smith, this persuasive mode is that which 
eventually gives rise to social cooperation and, hence, the division of labor, while the 
empathetic variety represents the communication of sentiments, or intentions of the 
speaker in a veracious and sincere way.  Nevertheless, this persuasive, or Machiavellian 
model of communication is flawed in the respect that it does not permit the 
establishment of stable cooperation between two speakers, since the speaker obtains 
more benefits than the listener, and does not fix any notion of trust between the two 
interlocutors.  It is the empathetic means of communication, by not granting any added 
benefit for either speaker or listener, which fosters trust between speaker and listener 
and, in essence, gives way to social cooperation which serves as the cornerstone of both 
language and trade 
18
 . 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Robert  Frank in Empathy and Fairness (2006). 
18
 Recent research concerning empathy, such as that which was presented at the Novartis Foundations 
Symposium 278, Empathy and Fairness, Chichester, U.K., John Wiley and Sons (2006), supports the idea 
that empathy is a cornerstone both cooperation and  justice.    
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